Krag Performance during SAW [Archive] - Culvers Shooting Page Forums

kragluver

07-16-2010, 07:38

We read the oft repeated case that the Krag was sorely out-classed by the 1893 Mauser during the Spanish American War, including the fact that it did not have clip loading capability. Historians and other writers who have continued to repeat these claims need to read this original information taken from interviews of officers immediately following the SAW:

http://books.google.com/books?id=fzKiAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA12&dq=annual+reports+of+the+war+department+magazine+r ifle&hl=en&ei=XuRATOL-N4GC8gbS0bHEDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCA#v=onepage&q&f=false

In particular - read Appendix 19, starting on pg 235.

The more I study the Krag and the eventual development and adoption of the 1903, the more I believe that the lack of clip loading capability was a stalking horse. I believe that politics (by none other than Theodore Roosevelt), more than anything else played into the derision of the Krag.

I think a very GOOD argument can be made for replacement of the Krag by the '03 in the cost and ease of manufacture arenas.

5MadFarmers

07-16-2010, 08:50

A report, by the ordnance department, containing the following gem (page 11):

"It should be stated, first, that the caliber .45 Springfield is one of the best of military rifles."

should be taken seriously?

100 years later we can see what turned out to be of value and what didn't. We also know what they felt at that time. The "clip loading" was simply one of death blows to the Krag. The others were:
1) That single lug. Limited ammunition power.
2) Rimmed rounds. They were no longer in vogue.
3) Length.

The Krags were not missed by the troops - the '03 was simply much more popular.

Time has spoken. The basics of the Krag design are history. "Mauser style" rifles are still being made. I'm surprised the 798 (http://www.remington.com/products/archived/centerfire/bolt-action/model-798.aspx) didn't sell better.

Mind you I like Krags. More than '03s by quite a bit. Doesn't change the fact that the Krag was replaced by a Mauserish design for specific reasons. The only real knock on the '03 is the "Kragish" bits of it.

Most of the bolt action rifles in service from 1886 into the 1950s were pretty much functional. The Lee and Mauser designs simply rose to the top. I'd say on merit.

Read that report again and see who the ranking officer on that board at Montauk point is. Then read his lovely little "what the perfect military rifle should be" report in a previous CoO report. Then chuckle.

JBinIll

07-16-2010, 09:07

Interesting reading.I note that one of the remarks made as to having clipped ammunition seems more to do with ease of handling the ammunition over loose cartridges carried in cartridge belts.The advantage of clip loading rifles in maintaining superiority of fire comes up quite a bit in the literature of the day about the Boer War.The British at that time were using cartridge belts and pouches for ammunition as we were.Many times it was remarked about the unending stream of fire from the clip loading Mauser rifle equiped Boers and the inferiority of the Lee-Enfield by comparison in ease of reloading and rapidity of fire.I think it was more a question of the speed at which a rifle could be reloaded and an easier method of handling cartridges other than singly than the inferiority of the Krag compared to the Mauser.Although it is interesting as to the remarks made about the soldiers leaving the magazine cut off engaged and loading single rounds.

Bill

07-17-2010, 05:47

The magazine cut off was most likely to some extent a carry over from the Indian wars. Remember, those officers making decisions were largely vetrans of those wars. One recurring theme was the Indians habit of charging when the troops found themselves with unloaded rifles.

Aimed fire was thought to be slow, and no need to use the magazine contents, which was kept in reserve for times of need.

Volley fire, as it was sometimes called, was intended to be only marginally aimed, and as fast as possible. Hence, clip loading was a significant factor.

If you read the history of the Boer war, much of the highly touted Mauser fire was from very long range, but of such intensity that even a small percentage of hits was effective.

dave

07-17-2010, 05:56

JBinIll

07-17-2010, 08:21

The magazine cut off was most likely to some extent a carry over from the Indian wars. Remember, those officers making decisions were largely vetrans of those wars. One recurring theme was the Indians habit of charging when the troops found themselves with unloaded rifle.

About the only common issued fire arm in that period with a cutoff were a few cavalry units equiped with Spencer carbines that had been fitted with Stabler cutoffs.Once the Model 1873 was adopted these were replaced pretty quickly.

The charging troops with unloaded rifles stories pretty much applies to troops equiped with muzzle loading rifles.It pretty much quit after the issue of the M1866 Springfield began as shown by the surprise of the Indians when that tactic was used at the Wagon Box and Hayfield Fights in 1867 during Red Clouds War against troops that had been recently equiped with the the M1866 Springfield and some civilians with Henry Rifles.Most Indian attacks only happened when they had a superiority of numbers.

5MadFarmers

07-17-2010, 08:25

much of the highly touted Mauser fire was from very long range, but of such intensity that even a small percentage of hits was effective.

That was the lesson of Plevna so it shouldn't have come to a surprise to them. I'm agreeing with you of course - the Boer war was influential. As was the Russian/Japanese dust-up.

The lessons learned in '61-'65 weren't terribly useful for the fighting in the west against the natives. Fighting against the natives wasn't terribly educational for the fighting in Cuba. Fighting in Cuba wasn't useful for the upcoming world match in France. The siege of Port Arthur would have been the event to study for the future of "mass" war.

The Krag was not a bad rifle. It simply wasn't as good as the Mauser when being rated by the criteria they used. The "advantage" of the '03 wasn't nearly as significant as the "disadvantage" of not having Maxim guns with them in Cuba. A lesson they didn't seem to understand and that came back to haunt them in 1917.

I prefer the Krags over the '03s. I'm not charging German trenches. Then again if I was going to be drafted into the AEF I'd not want the '03 either - a Remington Model 8 in .30 Remington would have been more useful.

I'd think loose rounds would have been a disaster in the mud of France.

JBinIll

07-17-2010, 08:55

It is interesting very little attention is paid to the Russo-Japanese war as a prelude to the trench warfare of WW1.There's not a whole lot of material on that war even from the period and very little newer material.

It's also interesting to note most of the early successfull machine gun designers were Americans who had to go to Europe to find backers and buyers.Then our military uses the Colt M1895 and the Benet-Mercie argueably the worst of the lot.

And thens there's the vaunted M1903 and all it's advantages over the Krag and when we go to war in 1917 most of the troops are equiped with a converted British rifle.

kragluver

07-17-2010, 09:21

That converted British rifle was a pretty darn good rifle for its day. It is a travesty that WW1 caught us so unprepared regarding various arms. In McBride's book A Rifleman Went to War, he states that the Colt 1895 machine gun (in use by the Canadians) was a very reliable and accurate weapon. He liked its slower rate of fire over the Maxim designs. Granted - one person's opinion.

5MF - I wasn't trying to say the Mauser design wasn't superior to the Krag, it clearly was. I just get tired of reading various histories of the fighting in Cuba stating how out-classed the Krag was by the Mauser when that report says the Krag performed just fine. Based on the cartridges both rifles used at the time, the two rifles were nearly equal. The Mauser obviously had considerably more design margin for growth to a higher pressure cartridge and that's where the design really shines! I am sure there were army politics at play there too and you would know the various personalities better than I regarding board members. The criticisms contained in the report regarding the Krag were relative nits. They seem not to like how the loose cartridges were carried and in that regard the clip would be better (although the majority of fire was single loaded). They did have quite a bit of harsh criticism regarding the various black powder arms.

The Mauser receiver just had to be easier and cheaper to manufacture as well. I think this was a major factor in the decision to switch, although you don't find it documented anywhere. The engineer side of me says this had to be a factor.

In the 1903 Ordnance report where they document testing between the Krag and the "experimental" rifle that became the M1903, the board stated that magazine fire should be the norm and not the exception. Its a wonder that the 1903 retained the magazine cut-off. I'll bet it was hardly used except to perform the manual of arms.

kragluver

07-17-2010, 09:31

A report, by the ordnance department, containing the following gem (page 11):

"It should be stated, first, that the caliber .45 Springfield is one of the best of military rifles."

should be taken seriously?

I must admit I missed reading that section the first time I looked through the report. I focused on the Appendices as that seemed to be where the most interesting technical information was contained.

That whole section on Small Arms beginning on pg 10 is interesting. They condemn the black powder ammo but not the arm - partly correct. They make some rather good points about the Springfield, but its day had clearly passed by the 1890s. For instance - one of the good points - I've read numerous accounts from Cuba and the Philippine Insurrection that state the terminal effects due to the 45-70 round were much more significant than either the 7x57 Mauser or 30-40 Krag round (no big surprise given non-expanding bullets). That entire section seemed to me to be a big qualifier and defensive "posturing" in an attempt to deflect criticism from the press.

5MadFarmers

07-17-2010, 09:46

I just get tired of reading various histories of the fighting in Cuba stating how out-classed the Krag was by the Mauser when that report says the Krag performed just fine.

Yes, we're in violent agreement on that. Pretty much all of the bolt action rifles in common service were functional. People nit the bits to a level which is likely not warranted.

I guess my point is one should always read the Ordnance Department reports as sales brochures. Ford's reports on F-150 trucks wouldn't read the same as Consumer Reports or GM's. Often the troops would be screaming one thing and the Ordnance Department, with their own agenda, quite another.

The troop reports which I found of most amusement were the "volunteer" troops with the .45 Springfields. They'd steal a Krag in a heartbeat and were very sad when forced to turn them in. Really not much different from Marines stealing M1 Garands from army troops on Guadalcanal. The troops spoke - the Krag was a desirable rifle.

Yes, the Spanish Mausers were good rifles. The Krags weren't bad either. The trapdoors and Remington rolling blocks were simply archaic at that point.

The report from Montauk always, and I do mean always, seemed to me to be a huge case of leading the questions.

"The cut-off is blued and hard to see, would it be better if that was left 'in the white' so you could see if it was on or off?"

"Yes, I guess so."

"The company commanders report that the cut-offs should be left in the white so they're easier to see when they're off or on."

Such focus on cut-offs. Given future performance I strongly doubt that the troops in the field generated that on their own.

JBinIll

07-17-2010, 10:03

I find it interesting in the Krag Mauser debates it is often mentioned about the lack of clip loading on the Krag.The comparisons always seem to mention speed of reloading and rapidity of fire then when we adopt a clip loading rifle we still keep the magazine cutoff.The British kept it on the Enfield until the Change Order in 1916.The Mauser had none.What was the point in retaining the magazine cutoff besides someone worrying about the troops using too much ammunition causing supply problems like the head of Ordnance during the Civil War.With the advent of the machine gun it was a moot point worrying about supply problems caused by soldiers with rifles using too much ammunition I'd say.

5MadFarmers

07-17-2010, 10:26

With the advent of the machine gun it was a moot point worrying about supply problems caused by soldiers with rifles using too much ammunition I'd say.

I hadn't even thought of that in relation to machine guns. Interesting point.

On the one hand they spent considerable amount of time in extolling the accuracy of rifles at 2,000 yards (Sandy Hook tests) yet on the other hand they were all big on troops not wasting ammunition. Given the velocity of that day's ammunition, and the truly mortar like trajectory, shooting at people (individually) at 2,000 yards would have been the biggest waste of ammunition. "Don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes" and all that. Plevna did in fact show that volley fire was effective so toss that into the mix. Along with heavy machine gun training in indirect firing for WW1.

The Ordnance Department was a very confused group. Lose the cutoff and issue a Pedersen device right?

JBinIll

07-17-2010, 10:45

The Ordnance Department was a very confused group. Lose the cutoff and issue a Pedersen device right?

LOL Ain't that the truth.

dave

07-17-2010, 02:41

Was "volley fire' ever really used in the US? I know the Brits used and trained in its use, had special sights for it, and it was effective for them.

5MadFarmers

07-17-2010, 03:36

Good question Dave. What the we typically call "volley fire" in regards with the Brits, and Russians, Germans, and others for that matter, isn't what the US army called "volley fire." So perhaps the different terms should be clarified. I say that as I don't think I was clear on it so I looked it up. When I mentioned "indirect fire" in regards to machine guns I hadn't related that to rifle fire but apparently should have.

Volley Fire. Troops firing on command. 1st volley, 2nd volley, etc.
Indirect fire. Fire directed at targets not visible.
Fire at will. Targeted individual fire.

A German Colonel named Balck mentioned that the Japanese, in the 1905 war, pretty much exclusively used fire at will whereas the Russians used volley fire.

So what we call "volley fire" for the Brits is "indirect fire" for us.

Firing Manual, 1909, mentions (for indirect fire) that "The opportunites for the employment of this kind of fire in service are rare."

So I'd say "no."

I'm glad you asked that. Made me dig a bit to clarify it for myself.

kragluver

07-18-2010, 11:30

In Shockley's book The Krag in the Service, he mentions indirect volley fire into the jungle. That's the only time I've read of accounts of US troops actually using the tactic.

sdkrag

07-19-2010, 10:31

Art

07-19-2010, 04:10

The British use of volley fire was very effective in the mass formation Euopean wars. It also worked against native troops until they ran out of ammo in Zulu land. But it wasn't particularly effective in the North American wars where the oppostition didn't fight by the rules. The Brits did not believe that the average soldier had the brains to fire at will. Also smooth bores were not effective at long range and accuracy was poor with non-rifled barrells. Thus command volley fire was the tactic used on the continent.
Our cutoffs were a carry over of the doctrine that the average soldier didn't have the brains to operate independently and the fire needed to be controled. Marksmanship training prior to the late 1870's was very marginal. More emphasis was given to individual marksmanship as the rifled arms and ammunition improved and the type of warfare changed. The Indian Wars were primarily guerilla in nature and emphasised the need for better individual marksmanship. Conservation of ammunition was also of concern. The belief was that with the switch from single shot to magazine arms there would be a loss of fire control and tne resulting waist of ammunition.

Every bit of that is true.

The Brits quickly repented of all that after the Boer war though. They adopted charger loading for the Lee Enfield rifles, abolished volley fire, gave the troops the ability to fire at will and drilled marksmanship and gun handling incessently. All of these things were gradually coming in after the Boer Wars but were institutionalized in the Musketry Regulations of 1909. These regulations were heavily influenced by Maj. N. R. McMahon who was running rifle training in the UK at the time and was heavily influenced by his own participation in the Boer Wars.

I recall, though I might be in error, that only the Russians still trained in volley fire in the first world war. A thing that shouldn't surprise anynone about the Tsar's army who'se officers absolutely didn't believe the average soldier had the brains to operate independently.

Maury Krupp

07-19-2010, 05:21

Was "volley fire' ever really used in the US?

US Army small arms firing and drill regulations included training for tactical (as opposed to ceremonial) volley firing through the 1913 versions.

It's the classic "Ready, Aim, Fire" we all think of.

In the 1889 manual the only types of firing were as skirmishers, volley, and file.

In 1891 there was volley, firing with counted cartridges, fire at will, and rapid fire.

It stayed that way in 1904 with the note that the use of the rifle as a single loader was "..to be regarded as exceptional."

By 1913 use of volley fire was normally limited to using it for range finding (a volley creates a bigger, easier to see splash).

So volley fire was in the books and was supposed to be trained on. Whether it was actually used and to what extent is another matter.

Maury

jon_norstog

07-19-2010, 07:10

Family experigence:

In my family the guy who regularly shot blind into the jungle was uncle Joe, a non-scandinavian who married in. Scandal! he served in the Navy during the 1920s - I think he was a BM or GM, but might have been a plain old deck ape. During the Nicarauguan occupation, his ship was tied up, maybe Managua. The jungle came right down to the docks. The men would patrol at night in dark clothes, and like sailors generally, were easily bored. To get a little action they would fire a few rounds into the jungle, duck for cover, and would be immediately rewarded by a shower of knives and machetes. Which they would gather up and take below to sell to their mates.

In later years Joe discovered that in his hands he had the gift to heal. My great aunt Aaasne went to him for treatment and ended up marrying him. She could walk and get around like a young woman until he died. Then her body quit working and she couldn't get out of bed for nothing.

But I digress ..

jn

kragnut

07-21-2010, 09:24

Art

07-22-2010, 06:07

I agree with the other poster....this was a red herring. Have you ever heard anybody call the krag "slow to load"? Frankly I've never like stripper clips. They require too much force and bust my thumb all the time. Plus the krag could be topped off while loaded for bear.

Keep in mind, almost all of the American volunteers, and some regular Army, were still equipped with trapdoor rifle. It was a real embarassment at a time of surging national pride that so many of our men were shot down by a second rate European power with supperior equipment while our troops had to charge enemy positions with a single shot BP rifle. The krag was a convenient scapegoat, and a lot of people in the Ordnance Dept didnt like the fact that we had to pay two Norweigan officers a dollar for every rifle we produced.

I've done a lot of stripper clip loading and I've never found them to require too much force or to "hurt my thumb." A stripper clip is nothing more than a speedloader for a rifle that allows the user to load five cartridges in the time it would usually take to load one. A Krag is faster to load with single cartridges than any of its competitors but its sustained rate of fire is simply not comparable to a clip loader, sore thumb or not. The Brits found the same thing in the Boer war with clip loaded Mausers opposed to single loaded Lee type rifles and promptly went to the charger system.

The Krag had a bunch of problems besides the fact that it didn't take a stripper clip that led to the introduction of the M1903 rifle.

One thing that does bear consideration. The Spaniards inflicted very heavy casualties on the U.S. Troops both at San Juan and Kettle hills and at El Caney. In fact at El Caney two re inforced Spanish companies held up an entire U.S. Division for an entire day until those Spanish boys ran out of ammunition. This naturally led the U.S. Authorities to look for an explanation. The fact that the Spaniards fielded a quality professional army that fought very well in Cuba, despite the incompetence and defeatism of its government and leaders was not as acceptable as the idea that the Spaniards had a better rifle.

As to the patent easement question, we tried to get around that by making some modifications to the Mauser system in the M1903 weapon. The folks at Mauser took us to court and won and sure enough we wound up paying Mauser a patent easement so that part was a wash, at least until after World War I when pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of Versilles the Germans were required to return the money we had given for the patent easement as part of a war reparation.

5MadFarmers

07-22-2010, 07:09

As to the patent easement question, we tried to get around that by making some modificatios to the Mauser system in the M1903 weapon. The folks at Mauser took us to court and won and sure enough we wound up paying Mauser a patent easement so that part was a wash, at least until after World War I when pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of Versilles the Germans were required to return the money we had given for the patent easement as part of a war reparation.

That part doesn't seem to make sense. The US never paid Mauser a penny so how would we get the money back through the Treaty of Versailles? Reparations for that treaty weren't against private companies in any event - they were against a government. Private property was treated very seriously and Mauser, strangely enough, was part of why treaties with post-war Germany were very delicate. That has to do with sewing machines and patents but no need to get into that.

Mauser assigned their patent interests, paid for obviously, to a company registered in the US. The money paid by the US government for use of the Mauser patents was paid to that company. So why the German government, or a German company, would pay "reparations" for money paid by the US government to an "American" company is a mystery.

Somewhere around here I have the patents used and the amount of money assessed against each. It became rather involved as the patents were all filed on different dates, thus timing out on different dates, but there was also a rider that the maximum amount to be paid was capped at $200,000.

The federal comptroller approved the payments and they were very specific on the amounts, accounts, and that payment could, and would, not be made beyond the expiration of a patent.

JBinIll

07-22-2010, 08:45

This issue of stripper clips has many varied opinions.One thing most often never mentioned is the changing logistics.When rifles were single shots ammunition handled in boxes or packets or packed loose in wood boxes like the British and carried in cartridge boxes or on looped belts was on the whole a satisfactory method of handling it given the usage and amount of rounds fired.Once the repeating smokeless powder rifle and it's friend the machine gun changed warfare,logistics of handling greatly increased quantities start to be a factor in the field and in the supply of troops.Ammunition in clips and bandoliers is easier to handle with less damage in the handling than loose ammo in boxes or packets.A 60 round bandolier is easier to pass out and carry than 3 20 round boxes of cartridges or grabbing handfulls of loose cartridges out of a crate.

Art

07-23-2010, 05:47

There were indeed penalties against private companies, though mostly indirect. The Treaty of Versailles put Mauser out of the export military rifle busines is one example. After the war export Mausers were generally produced by the Belgians and Czechs

It is my understanding, and I don't have the article anymore either, that as part of the reparations under the "war guilt clause" the United States arranged for repayment of the patent easement it had been forced to pay to Mauser. Whether Mauser or the German government repaid the money, which as you said wasn't a whole bunch, I do not know.

Art

07-23-2010, 06:23

kragluver

07-23-2010, 11:10

The Brits quickly repented of all that after the Boer war though. They adopted charger loading for the Lee Enfield rifles, abolished volley fire, gave the troops the ability to fire at will and drilled marksmanship and gun handling incessently.

True, but it is interesting that up through the P14, the Brits retained the volley fire sight. They finally dumped it after WW1.

kragnut

07-23-2010, 07:07

came down to was a relatively green, mostly volunteer army carrying primarily black powder single shot arms had to charge up several hills against a well entreched, professionally trained European army waiting for them at the tops using modern bolt actions.

jon_norstog

07-26-2010, 09:23

......

One thing that does bear consideration. The Spaniards inflicted very heavy casualties on the U.S. Troops both at San Juan and Kettle hills and at El Caney. In fact at El Caney two re inforced Spanish companies held up an entire U.S. Division for an entire day until those Spanish boys ran out of ammunition. This naturally led the U.S. Authorities to look for an explanation. The fact that the Spaniards fielded a quality professional army that fought very well in Cuba, despite the incompetence and defeatism of its government and leaders was not as acceptable as the idea that the Spaniards had a better rifle.....

Art, you are dead-on right here

When I was a kid, we were fed a number of myths about the Spanish American War. One of them was that the Spanish were a bunch of cowards who melted at the sight of a few American boys. Another was that the SAW was a kind of picnic, a “splendid little war” more like a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta than a ghastly conflict like the Civil War or the Great War that was to come.

When I got away from school I started reading first-person accounts of what really happened. First myth: the Spanish were as brave an enemy as you could find anywhere. At El Caney they fought to the knife, and most of them died there. The fighting was dead serious and casualties were high on both sides – think 20% casualties in 2-3 minutes for two companies of the 71st New York, just covering the Artillery while they repositioned a few howitzers.

Something else they never taught was the role played by the Buffalo Soldiers. It was elements of the 24th Infantry that took the lines at El Caney. It was a political war, too. At Kettle Hill, the Generals knew that politics dictated the 1st new York Volunteer Cav, AKA Rough Riders, had to be given a prominent role. No one knew if they were any good. Shafter and his staff put the 10th Cavalry on their left, and a white unit, the 3rd Cavalry, on their right to stiffen them up. Most of the 10th, along with elements of the 24th and 25th Infantry, took San Juan Hill, with the rest of the 10th going up Kettle. Nobody ever mentioned that when I was in school.

Here's an eye-witness account from El Caney:

"Finally, late in the afternoon, our brave Lieutenant Kinnison said to another officer: “We cannot take the trenches without charging them.” Just as he was about to give the order for the bugler to sound “the charge,” he was wounded and carried to the rear. The men were then fighting like demons. Without a word of command, though led by that gallant and intrepid Second Lieutenant J. A. Moss, 25th Infantry, some one gave a yell and the 25th Infantry was off, alone to the charge. The 4th U.S. Infantry, fighting on the left, halted when those dusky heroes made the dash with a yell which would have done credit to a Comanche Indian. No one knows who started the charge; one thing is certain, at the time it was made excitement was running high; each man was a captain for himself and fighting accordingly. Brigadier Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, etc., were not needed at the time the 25th Infantry made the charge on El Caney, and those officers simply watched the battle from convenient points, as Lieutenants and enlisted men made the charge alone. It has been reported that the 12th U.S. Infantry made the charge, assisted by the 25th Infantry, but it is a recorded fact that the 25th Infantry fought the battle alone, the 12th Infantry coming up after the firing had nearly ceased. Private T. C. Butler, Company H, 25th Infantry, was the first man to enter the blockhouse at El Caney, and took possession of the Spanish flag for his regiment. An officer of the 12th Infantry came up while Butler was in the house and ordered him to give up the flag, which he was compelled to do, but not until he had torn a piece off the flag to substantiate his report to his Colonel of the injustice which had been done to him. Thus, by using the authority given him by his shoulder-straps, this officer took for his regiment that which had been won by the hearts' blood of some of the bravest, though black, soldiers of Shafter’s army."

Sgt. major Frank W. Pullen, jr.

There are still lessons to be learned from that war, I think.

jn

Dick Hosmer

07-27-2010, 09:19

Can any holder of the 1902 or 1903 RCOs tell me whether or not either report references the detailed procedings of the Board of Ordnance and Fortiifications for those years? The BoOF overviews/synopses available (so far) on Google are far too general. I'm specifically looking for anything that would tend to support my theory that the Board MAY have tested one (or more) of the 26" rifles in carbine wood. My rifle 388786 was found thus, and the overall make-up, plus the components (one being a scarce M1902C sight) utilized, suggest at least the possibility of someone other than Bubba. The full Board files are apparently at NARA/MD, but I lack the resources to access them. Thank you in advance.

jon_norstog

07-27-2010, 09:21

Getting back to the Krag in the SAW, there were a lot of them dropped by KIA and wounded on Sanjuan and Kettle Hills. They didn't stay on the ground long, the troops that had Springfields (trapdoors) picked them up, cleaned them and kept them until - get this!- the supply team caught up with them and made them hand them in.

I had my finger on some reports from the China Campaign as well. There were troops and weapons from all over the world there. The Krags were admired and coveted by the Brits, French and others, at least that was what was reported. You look at a krag, you can see why, I think. Were they a better battle rile than the Mauser or Lee Enfield? Probably not, but they **looked** great, and were a machinist's work of art.

It's along the lines of asking whether a spike helmet was superior to the Tommy's tin lid.

the Krag got the job done. It was the soldier, not the rifle, that was important.

jn

jn

Griff Murphey

07-28-2010, 05:00

I thought the indians charged when the Winchester 73's the cavalry had ran out of shells... but that was Hollywood and TV. Trapdoor Springfields were stand-ins for M-1861s in Civil War flicks and often for Brown Besses in Revolutionary War films.

I have a friend in Georgia who, after lots of practice, has been able to get off all 10 in 80 seconds with a trapdoor in Vintage Rifle rapid fire, winning matches. But that's not full power ammo, I reckon, and carefully tuned for match accuracy.

John Sukey

07-29-2010, 12:30

I just wonder what the troops thought charging up Kettle hill and having to reach into their cartridge belts for individual rounds when the magazine ran dry.
But then I also wonder what the thinking was when the mouser was available for testing at the same time as the krag and we could have had either one.
If you were defending a trench, then it didn't matter whether you had a krag or a mouser.

Come to think of it, they NEVER would have got to the top if it wasn't for Lt. Parker and his gatlings plus the 10th Cavalry providing flanking fire to keep the Spanish heads down.

jon_norstog

07-29-2010, 09:55

John,

Yeah, let's hear it for the Buffalo Soldiers.

Guys, based on this thread, we're all kind of dodging the OP's quesion, which was about the actual performance of the Krag rifle in the Spanish American War. We're doing this because, like the Ordnance Board 110 years ago, we don't want to admit we are backing a battle rifle with a fatal flaw.

Like the Board, we fell in love with a rifle that is a beautiful work of art. Compared to the Krag, every other battle rifle of the period is a bucket of bolts. The Board never thought we would need a half-million of them. Like Denmark and Norway, we were thinking small. Small, profesional army.

The Swedes took their armed neutrality serously, and bought/made enough Mausers so they could mobilize their entire male population. Speed of loading in the field is an issue, yeah. Ease of manufacture is the other factor favoring the Mauser over the Krag. There are more machined parts in the Krag magazine than in a whole mauser rifle.

In the trenches, the Krag would have been just fine. In a mad charge to carry an enemy line of trenches, it would have been nomore or less useful than a P-17 or Springfield. The weapons of choice for that sort of action would have to be the trench shotgun and the Thompson submachine gun.

Well that's my 2 cents worth, anyway.

jn

Paladin

07-30-2010, 05:35

JBinIll

07-30-2010, 10:14

John,

In the trenches, the Krag would have been just fine. In a mad charge to carry an enemy line of trenches, it would have been nomore or less useful than a P-17 or Springfield. The weapons of choice for that sort of action would have to be the trench shotgun and the Thompson submachine gun.

jn

They may not have been in the trenches in WW1 but they were in France.In Mallory's The Krag Rifle Story it is mentioned several Railway Engineer units were equiped with Krags,at least one of which came under enemy fire.It is estimated possibly up to 10,000 Krags served in France until replaced.

Art

07-30-2010, 10:44

There were a lot of bolt gun designs that had seen their day by World War I. The Krag was probably the best of the ones that had flaws that made them obsolescent by 1914. Others were the various Hotchkiss designs, and I include the Lebel in that as well as the assorted Manlicher Berthier's used by the French. Unfortunately for the French they were forced to soldier on with outdated bolt guns throung most of "The Great War." Krags were beautiful rifles, as mentioned above, but by the time of the Spanish American War their time had already just about passed in favor of simpler clip loading or charger loading rifles.

The Mauser and Lee designs wound up sweeping the field because they were simply better battle rifles.

Art

07-30-2010, 11:34

I'm sure most posters here have seen it, but in the 1990s movie The Rough Riders, they covered the black cavalry soldiers pretty well. Even showed them with 1896 carbines as I recall. Some of the older Buffalo Soldiers were some of the only US troops with any actual fighting experience under their belts.

http://www.wheelerplantation.org/images/Stivers_a_day_of_honor.jpg

Reservists and National Guard units always get the hand me down weapons and equipment. In the Viet Nam era most National Guard and a lot of reserve units were still equiped with the M1 and other world war II weapons. The 9th and 10th Cavalry, being regular army units would have been armed with the new(er) Krag rifles while all those reservists and National Guard units who made up the majority of the troops sent to Cuba would have, undoubtedly, still been armed with single shot black powder rifles. A tribute to just how unprepared we were.

I still consider it fortuitous that the Spaniards had written off winning the war and settled for "looking good losing." They did not oppose our landings and made no serious attempt to relieve Santiago from Havana. Both of which decisions by the Spanish "powers that be" or "were" at that time were very, very good for us.

It didn't hurt a bit, either that the quality of the Spanish navy in 1898 was quite poor.

5MadFarmers

07-31-2010, 05:50

Coast Defense. We were all about Coast Defense. With a strong Navy and a strong Coast Defense it would be hard to attack the US. Rifles weren't even 2nd fiddle - perhaps 3rd. The thought of that era was a strong defense and the army never gets involved overseas. The USMC does from time to time but never the army.

Which, upon reflection, maybe isn't such a bad idea.

JBinIll

07-31-2010, 10:09

kragluver

08-01-2010, 09:03

Yes he did. However, in a world where you can get anywhere you want in 24 hours or a rogue nation can deliver an unwelcome package on your doorstep in a matter of minutes, our "event horizons" have to extend far beyond our national borders. The BG's on 9/11 demonstrated an extremely "low tech" approach to doing extreme damage. Granted, a man with a rifle is not likely to stop any of those events.

Col. Colt

10-18-2011, 03:04

11mm

10-18-2011, 04:55

Sorry to come in late - but this is a pretty interesting (and historically informative) thread!

I would ask the question: " Where there any battles/skirmishes lost/units overrun due to the lack of charger loading on the Krag?" and "Would our casualties have been lighter with a better (Mauser type) rifle?" In other words, did it matter? Are there any honest reports that state anything like this? I would think the ballistic differences between the .30-40 and the 7MM Mauser would have also counted for something at range - but maybe not at what was mostly a close range war. CC
I think it mattered only in the casualties from the use of black powder trapdoor Springfields. The tactics would have been the same.
Just my two cents on this very interesting thread, but if our troops had been completely armed (and trained) with the Krag, there would have been no shooting into the smoke of the trapdoors, and maybe fewer casualties. Also, the sights on an 1896 Krag were as good as the sights on the 1893 Mauser. Flat shooting is good, and I believe the Mauser and its cartridge were technically superior, but if the Spanish Government did not have the will (and the Navy) to win, what would the difference have been if the Trapdoors were or were not there? Mausers did not win the Boer War against Enfields, Metfords and .303 Martinis. Stripper clips did not win it, either. The Krag was good enough.

Plain Old Dave

10-18-2011, 07:32

For my part, I have never bought into the "superior Mauser design" line. Expressed before, but will do so again; the purpose of shooting is HITTING. 1 hit is better than 10 misses, especially when that 1 hit is a .30 and the 10 misses are 7mm.

Accuracy? American riflemen, no contest.
Terminal power? .30 is bigger than 7mm. Physics.
Sustained firepower? Krag-armed "Rattle Battle" teams shot with 1903-armed teams for years. No advantage there, either.

The only 'defect' in an SAW '96 Krag was the sight, and that was rectified in 1901. Even the SOLDIERS preferred the Krag to the 1903's punishing report and heavy recoil.

Resolved: The purpose of the rifleman is precision aimed fire on targets in visual range; the purpose of supporting arms is support of the rifleman in the advance by volume fire.

I am rambling, but I have always believed the Krag-armed US regulars in the SAW had the finest battle rifle available at the time.

John Sukey

10-19-2011, 03:25

Art

10-19-2011, 08:31

On volley fire. British version in WW1 was Not what folks think. It was NOT aimed fire but rather a unit firing in unison at a certain sight setting to deny a staging area to the enemy for their attack. You didn't SEE your target, the idea was to put a lot of bullets in a certain area for "whom it may concern" to break up an enemy formation.
Now while the Krag may have been on a par with the mouser, try removing INDIVIDUAL cartridges from your belt and dumping them in the magazine while charging up Kettle hill. All the spanish had to do was open the bolt and jam a five round clip of ammunition in the rifle, then close the bolt. All that while remaining stationery.

John is correct on the evolving definition of "volley fire" and in U.S. and British service the extremely long range settings and especially the side sights on early SMLEs were actually used for indirect fire.

The biggest advantage of the Mauser system was what was called, as I recall on the original patent, the "cartridge packet for magazine guns." Of course that is what on this side of "the pond" is referred to as a "stripper clip" and on the other as a "charger." This one innovation was the single greatest advance in the Mauser design. When the Brits encountered it first in the Boer War and we did in the Spanish American War the superiority of the clip loaded Mauser over the Lee Enfield and Krag Jorgensen designs which had to be loaded with individual cartridges was apparent to everyone. For the Brits converting the Lee system to clip loading was simple. For us with the Krag it wasn't. Both the early lees and the Krags were every bit as good battle rifles as the Mausers until you had to reload.

I've read a lot on these threads about the equivalence of the Krag and the Mauser '95. If they had been shown to truly be equivalent in combat the penurious War Department would not have adopeted a modified Mauser system rifle in them M1903. With combat in mind I'll post a few stats from the decisive battles around Santiago in the Spanish American War.

At El Caney the Americans in division strength, 6,653 infantry armed almost excluseively with Krag rifles (one battalion of attached Marines were armed with Navy Lee clip loaders and one regiment of volunteers, the 2nd Mass was armed with "Trapdoors) was stopped cold by two reinforced companies of Spaniards armed with Mausers for almost an entire day. In fact the Spaniards were only dislodged when they ran out of ammunition. The small number (about 800) trapdoor armed troops were withdrawn early in the battle when it was realized that they were simply at too great a disadvantage, no big loss considering the overwhelming numerical advantage enjoyed by the Americans..

El Caney strength:

Spain - 514 regular infantry, 100 armed civilians, 2 Hontoria howitzers. Total casualties 176 (38 dead 138 wounded)
United States - 6,653 infantry, approx 1,000 "insurrectos," 4 field guns. Total casualties 441 (81 dead 360 wounded not counting insurrectos)

The results are even more striking on San Juan and Kettle hills where the Spaniards were so understrength they had to defend the geologic crest instead of the "military" crest which meant the Americans going up the hills could regroup in a natural defilade before making a final push to the top.

San Juan - Kettle Hill strength:

Spain - Approx 800 regulars, 5 field guns. Total casualties 228 (58 dead 170 wounded)

United States - approx 15,000 infantry of which all but one regiment, the 71st New York Volunteers (800-1,000 men,) were armed with Krags, 12 field guns, 4 Gatling guns, 2 Colt machine guns. Casualties, U.S. only (1,385 including 205 dead, 1,180 wounded) In both cases adding the number of KIA insurrectos would have increased the disparity even more.

so in the fighting to secure the heights around Santiago about 1,300 Spaniards (the equivalent of just two understrength regiments) armed with Mauser 95s inflicted 1,826 casualties on an American force of over 21,000 of whom over 90% were armed with Krag Jorgensens while suffering 304 casualties themselves. What would your objective opinion be faced with those statistics as to which side had the superior shoulder weapon?

This is a very large disparity in casualties especially considering the overwhelming numerical superiority of the U.S. Troops the vast majority of whom were regulars. The U.S. came to the same conclusion the Brits did that the overwhelming advantage in volumn of fire permitted by the Mauser system clip loading simply had to be addressed. The Brits did it by modifying the Lee system we accomplished it by adopting a modified Mauser.

Militaries have to look at performance in battle and as a result of actual battle experience the conclusion was logically drawn that the Mauser was the superior system.

11mm

10-19-2011, 09:09

Art-
Agreed. The take-away that the clip loading Mauser was superior to the Krag in those instances was correct as far as volume of fire.
However, I wonder if there was an after action conclusion about the casualties resulting from attempting frontal assaults, up hill, against entrenched positions held by troops with modern rifles (kind of a Fredericksburg/Cold Harbor syndrome), coupled with ignorance of the terrain? Certainly, the tactics should have been reviewed as far as the casualties.
Despite subsequent battles in the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars, what happened during WW1 indicates that the word had not yet gotten around.

Plain Old Dave

10-19-2011, 07:45

Hear, hear, Eleven Mike Mike... The Conventional Wisdom has always been that the US forces took heavy casualties due to the 'superior' clip-fed Mausers. Conventional History would have us believe that US troops were killed wholesale fumbling with loose .30 Krag rounds by fast-shooting Spanish soldados.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The lack of discipline in the advance has been covered upthread, and I might well have just come onto something. I see very little if any co-ordination between the Infantry and the Supporting Arms in Cuba and not much co-ordination of the advance at above small-unit (i.e. Company strength) level. In 1898, the only Soldiers with large-unit handling experience were elderly Colonels and Generals and some First Sergeants and Sergeants Major. Fitz Lee and Joe Wheeler were not given their billets as 'political sops' as Conventional History says. Instead, they were brought in to address a glaring lack of institutional experience in large-unit combat; both men had experience at the Brigade, Division, and Corps level, experience the US Army sorely lacked. If Spain had been interested in winning or fighting to a draw, the war in Cuba could have been very ugly, indeed.

Excessive US casualties should properly be attributed to lack of large-unit combat doctrine and an almost total lack of experience handling large units; Major-General Shafter may have led a brigade during the Civil War, Lawton led regiments, and every other US leader was at most a JO with no experience at greater than Company strength. The US Army had not operated at the level landed at Daiquiri since the Grand Review of the Armies in 1865.

Real takeaway on Krag performance: The Krag performed as advertised in Cuba. It did everything it was supposed to, within the confines of War Department doctrine (or "tactics" as combat maneuver was known then). The war DID, however, expose serious deficiencies in US doctrine which were unjustly blamed on the Krag and Springfield rifles. The deficiencies were not truly addressed until the AEF deployed to France in 1917, and the US did not have a truly cohesive, coherent combined-arms doctrine until the dawn of the Second World War.

jon_norstog

10-19-2011, 09:02

Art has the statistics, but what they prove to me is that an exposed, frontal assault on a dug-in enemy is suicidal. What amazes me is that the Americans pulled it off with such **light** casualties. I'm thinking they must have really charged once they got over the military crest of Kettle Hill. As for El Caney, they had the sense to slow down, rather than try to keep to schedule.

The exposed part of the Kettle Hill assault, I doubt most of the soldiers would have been able to fire 5 rounds. They were running uphill into a hail of lead, the only think to do was get to the enemy's lines as fast as they could and use the knife. It helped that the Gatlings were firing fast as they could down below, making life interesting for those Spanish who might want to take an aimed shot at the advancing Americans.

Joe Wheeler was sick in bed that day and didn't have much to do with the handling of the units. Command had agreed on a plan ahead of time, but Kent f***ed it up by diverting his whole command through Bloody Ford, and not telling ANYONE, and the troops that were supposed to just waltz through El Caney and come up on the left instead got hung up there all day. The plan fell by the wayside, leading to a tactical situation which the officers in the field resolved with a charge.

the units that were disadvantaged by their weapons were those armed with trapdoors. I read a letter home from a soldier in the 35th Michigan who said his unit didn't get to fight becaUSE none of the regulars wanted to be anywhere near men who were shooting off black powder. The 35th Mich ended up siting out the fight behind a knoll, mauser bullets whizzing harmlessly overhead..

It takes a radical weapons advantage to mAKE a difference. The Krag had a radical advantage over the trapdoor. A similarly radical advantage would have been if the Army had got hold of a few thousand M-1s or M-14s, either of which can be fired to great effect at a dead run. Dick, 5MF, fire up your time machines and drop off a couple thousand stand, plus ammo!

I tend to think that one bolt gun may be marginally better than another, but that what counts more in a fight is the fighting quality and tactical imagination of the men, both the grunts and NCOs and the junior and mid-grade officers.

I ordered Elmore Leonard's "Cuba Libre" which is set in Spanish-American War Cuba and Florida. I'll be interested to see what that old liar can do with the setting.

jn

Art

10-19-2011, 09:32

Dave and Jon

If you want to see an example of real incompetence you have to look no farther than the Spanish government in Madrid which didn't think it could win the war and, in a nutshell, let its commanders know they were expected to "look good losing" The Spanish general at Santiago, Linares, from all I can tell, was a total incompetent who kept 10,000 troops in Santiago and made no attempt to re inforce the pitifully small garrisons on the heights.

The American plan, which was sound, was to take El Caney and turn the flank of the Spaniards on the San Juan Heights. It would have worked too if Shafter hadn't taken all day to take El Caney.

I don't care what your combined arms doctrinal deficiencies are 7,000 men shouldn't need all day to dislodge less than 600 men at El Caney and 19,000 men shouldn't have had the difficulty they did taking the San Juan Heights. In fact officers on the scene say that had it not been for the suppresive fire of the American Gatling guns (that pesky volumne of fire again) two divisions of American regular professional soldiers would have been defeated by 800 Spaniards. I think that a bit extreme but they were there and I wasn't.

The Model 1886 Lebel performed as expected as well but I don't think anyone here would prefer one as a battle rifle over an M1903 or an SMLE, Well maybe they would since rapid reloading in a military rifle dosen't seem to be looked on as a necessary attribute in some quarters.

Plain Old Dave

10-20-2011, 08:47

Dave and Jon

The American plan, which was sound, was to take El Caney and turn the flank of the Spaniards on the San Juan Heights. It would have worked too if Shafter hadn't taken all day to take El Caney.

To be expected; the largest field command he held in the Civil War I can find evidence of was a regiment.

I don't care what your combined arms doctrinal deficiencies are 7,000 men shouldn't need all day to dislodge less than 600 men at El Caney and 19,000 men shouldn't have had the difficulty they did taking the San Juan Heights.

Look at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. Hood was a brilliant divisional commander but well out of his depth at Corps level (which is what the Army of Tennessee was by that time, really).

In fact officers on the scene say that had it not been for the suppresive fire of the American Gatling guns (that pesky volumne of fire again) two divisions of American regular professional soldiers would have been defeated by 800 Spaniards. I think that a bit extreme but they were there and I wasn't.

Volume of fire is the proper purview of Supporting Arms. Support of the Riflemen while they close with the enemy to defeat him in close combat.

The Model 1886 Lebel performed as expected as well but I don't think anyone here would prefer one as a battle rifle over an M1903 or an SMLE, Well maybe they would since rapid reloading in a military rifle dosen't seem to be looked on as a necessary attribute in some quarters.

A Krag can maintain the same rate of sustained accurate fire as an M1903. Proven conclusively at the Infantry Trophy Matches.

kragluver

10-20-2011, 09:22

As I had stated in an earlier post, I believe manufacturing cost and time was a big reason to switch to the Mauser based action. Here's some data I recently compiled:

Rifle Model No. of Receiver/Magazine Machining Operations
1896 Krag 131 (receiver) + 34 (magazine gate)
1898 Krag 121 (receiver) + 27 (magazine gate)
M1903 92 (receiver) + 3 (magazine floorplate)
1. Krag data from the 1898 Chief of Ordnance report, App 3
2. M1903 data from Our Rifles and Machine Guns

Art

10-21-2011, 03:28

To be expected; the largest field command he held in the Civil War I can find evidence of was a regiment.

Look at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. Hood was a brilliant divisional commander but well out of his depth at Corps level (which is what the Army of Tennessee was by that time, really).

Volume of fire is the proper purview of Supporting Arms. Support of the Riflemen while they close with the enemy to defeat him in close combat.

A Krag can maintain the same rate of sustained accurate fire as an M1903. Proven conclusively at the Infantry Trophy Matches.

1. First, I made an error as to the commander on the ground at El Caney. It was not Gen Shafter but General Henry Ware Lawton.

One thing I enjoy is doing the research for posts sometimes and I found Lawton to be an interesting man. He began the Civil War as an enlisted man on one of Lincolns 90 day programs. Was commissioned an officer in 1861 and fought at Chicamauga and Shiloh. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism during the Atlanta campaign. by the end of the war he was breveted a colonel. During the Indian Wars he was placed in charge of the hunt for Geronimo during which his tenacity in pursuit was greatly credited with pacifying the southwest. He was considered notable for his compassion for the Indians. In the Spanish American War it was he who saved Joe Wheelers Bacon at Las Guasimas and he was assigned by Gen Shafter with the task of turning the Spanish flank at El Caney during the assault on the San Juan heights. At El Caney he was criticised for his use of Col Allyn Capran Sr.s Artillery battery. He became military governonr of Cuba for a while before being assigned to the Philippines to fight the Guerillas there. In the P.I. Aguinaldo called him "night attack Lawton" because of his numerous and effective night assaults on the guerrillas. Like most officers of his generation he tended to lead from the front and was killed in the Philippines during an engagement by a sniper under the command of a guerrilla officer named, ironically, Licineo Geronimo.

When it comes to Civil War experience it should be rememberd that the Civil War ended over 30 years before the Spanish American War and it would be hard to find any commander in 1898 who had held an independent command in the Civil War.

2. The battles of Franklin and Nashville can't be compared to the capture of the San Juan Heights on any level. Those battles were fought by entire corps by troops using identical weapons and employing outdated tactics in the assault that were designed with weapons that had been obsolete for some time in mind. Truly fighting the last war disasterously. In 1891 the Army had revamped its infantry tactics and no longer were assaults made shoulder to shoulder in line of battle at the "quick step" of 120 beats per minute. Rather they were made in open order and the doctrine called for assaults in "rushes." At Franklin the Confederates for one of the very few times actually had an advantage in numbers. At Franklin the Confedrates outnumbered the Union forces just under 1.5 to 1. In the battles for the San Juan Heights and El Caney the Americans outnumbered the Spaniards a stunning 15 to 1 and the disparity gets much larger if engaged insurrectos are counted. At El Caney where the Americans (not counting attached "insurrectos") outnumbered the Spaniards 12 to 1 they were pinned down for hours and only were able to take the place when the Spaniards exhausted their ammunition. When over 6500 men are pinned down by rifle fire from less than 600 men for hours there is a problem. Once again I think the facts speak for themselves.

3. A match is not combat. It's a game.

I have never shot in the match you mentioned, however I just looked at the course of fire for the "rattle battle" matches and if they haven't changed since the Krags competed they prove absolutely nothing about sustained fire in combat. The (current) course of fire calls for the issuance of 384 rounds to the team of six using the National Match course of fire with breaks between stages and rapid fire strings of 10 rounds in 70 seconds. Of course under those conditions the Krag can be the equvalent of an '03 since speed of reload is really a negligible consideration that only applies in the rapid fire stages at all.

At El Caney, by the way, the Spanish defenders were given 250,000 rounds which sounds like a lot until you realize it breaks down to between 500 and 600 rounds a man. Not much when considering there was no resupply.

Plain Old Dave

10-21-2011, 05:56

When it comes to Civil War experience it should be rememberd that the Civil War ended over 30 years before the Spanish American War and it would be hard to find any commander in 1898 who had held an independent command in the Civil War.

The Civil War was the last time the United States Army deployed in combat at greater than brigade level. Only place a whole brigade of US Army soldiers amassed between 1865 and 1898 was the Plains of West Point. The Indian Wars were by nature small-unit wars; Company-strength to occasionally whole regiments. Given this historical fact, the poor performance of US Division and Corps commanders in Cuba was only to be expected. Wheeler was the best Division commander the US had in Cuba by the simple fact that he had already led a Division, a duty no Regular Army general in Cuba could boast.

Once again I think the facts speak for themselves.

3. A match is not combat. It's a game.

I have never shot in the match you mentioned, however I just looked at the course of fire for the "rattle battle" matches and if they haven't changed since the Krags competed they prove absolutely nothing about sustained fire in combat. The (current) course of fire calls for the issuance of 384 rounds to the team of six using the National Match course of fire with breaks between stages and rapid fire strings of 10 rounds in 70 seconds. Of course under those conditions the Krag can be the equvalent of an '03 since speed of reload is really a negligible consideration that only applies in the rapid fire stages at all.

You mistake the function of the rifleman; you seem to be of the Army school of thought; the infantryman as deliverer of mass fire.

That's the function of Supporting Arms; heavy machine guns and artillery in the SAW context.

The mission of the Rifleman is destruction of the enemy by precision aimed fire at long range and when necessary by close combat.

In the proper mission of the Rifleman, the Krag surrenders no ground to any contemporary, whether Lee, Mauser, Lebel, or Mosin.

Art

10-21-2011, 06:45

Dave

First the history of the Spanish army was exactly the same only worse. The Spaniards had not fought a regular army since Napoleon. All of their fighting had been in various colonial wars against "native" opposition and by any account their leadership was much more incompetent than ours. So they had absolutely no advantage in experience in combined arms operations or set battles against a modern army armed with modern weapons in division strength.

On rifle doctrine. In World War II the Army and the Marines had exactly the same rifle doctrine. One of my favorite uncles who fought all the way across Europe with Patton told me that one of the first orders of business was to break the new guys of exactly the thinking you espouse. The new guys would not fire there weapons unless they could identify a target. If you're recieving fire from a woodline you put fire on that woodline and as much fire as possible. I'm sure those 6,500 plus U.S. soldiers and marines pinned down for 12 hours by less than 600 Spaniards would be glad to know that the Spaniards choice of a weapon had absolutely nothing to do with the fact that they couldn't "take that hill" until those Spanish boys ran out of ammo.

Art

10-21-2011, 06:58

P.S. to my above. Because of the doctrine you mention the Marines went into World War II with a bolt action repeater. "Chesty" Puller was a big advocate of keeping the M1903 rifle when the M1 was adopted. Of course on Guadalcanal the Marines stole every M1 they could get their hands on when the Army arrived. I wonder why that was? Puller later admiltted that the decision to stay with the M1903 as long as the Corps did was a mistake.

Plain Old Dave

10-22-2011, 03:53

We read the oft repeated case that the Krag was sorely out-classed by the 1893 Mauser during the Spanish American War, including the fact that it did not have clip loading capability. The more I study the Krag and the eventual development and adoption of the 1903, the more I believe that the lack of clip loading capability was a stalking horse. I believe that politics (by none other than Theodore Roosevelt), more than anything else played into the derision of the Krag.

I think a very GOOD argument can be made for replacement of the Krag by the '03 in the cost and ease of manufacture arenas.

We have drifted considerably. I think you're on to something there, but ease of manufacture is really secondary to the lack of modern warfighting doctrine. The US Army in 1898 was a force almost perfectly suited to Indian fighting, but the War Department had only given cursory review of any form of large-scale warfighting doctrine. They had never considered fighting an international war, so never planned for any of the infrastructure an internationally-deployed expeditionary force might need, like an easy-to-manufacture infantry arm. The Krag (as I have said consistently) was a fine arm and was every bit as good an infantry arm as anything else then available. I also think the 'slow loading Krag" was a stalking horse, but to cover for inexperienced US Division and Corps commanders laboring under an almost total lack of warfighting doctrine and large-unit handling experience.

jon_norstog

10-22-2011, 07:33

Guys,

France and Flanders must have been a real eye-opener for the Americans, especially the NCOs and the junior and mid-grade officers (like Patton), who were in the field and got to see how the pros went at it when they attacked a dug-in enemy. We knew how in 1863, but then we forgot.

jn

Art

10-23-2011, 08:59

We have drifted considerably. I think you're on to something there, but ease of manufacture is really secondary to the lack of modern warfighting doctrine. The US Army in 1898 was a force almost perfectly suited to Indian fighting, but the War Department had only given cursory review of any form of large-scale warfighting doctrine. They had never considered fighting an international war, so never planned for any of the infrastructure an internationally-deployed expeditionary force might need, like an easy-to-manufacture infantry arm. The Krag (as I have said consistently) was a fine arm and was every bit as good an infantry arm as anything else then available. I also think the 'slow loading Krag" was a stalking horse, but to cover for inexperienced US Division and Corps commanders laboring under an almost total lack of warfighting doctrine and large-unit handling experience.

That is a valid point as far as it goes, but again, in 1898 Spain and many other countries of Europe had not fought a war against a European army equipped with up to date equipment since 1814! In terms of the type of fighting you mention the British and Russians had not fought such a war since 1859. In fact when the B.E.F. went to France in 1914 the brits had not engaged a modern army, deployed an entire division, or indeed fought anything except colonial wars in 58 years! Of the European powers only the Germans and French had fought modern militaries (each other) more recently than we had in the Civil War when the Germans defeated the French in a war of maneuver in 1870. In that conflict both sides used single shot breach loaders.

It is rare for any military to adapt to the changes made by technology without actually encountering it, or to train for a style of warfare it is not actively engaged in. In 1859 the French fought the Austrians in a minor territorial war in Italy. Philip Guedalla writes that in that conflict "....the French enjoyed in 1859 the pleasing experience of defeating with the methods of 1809 an army whose military thought was that of 1759...."

You are correct that the thread has wandered, as they tend to do, but I would also like to say the tactics and techniques of the employment of the bolt action magazine rifle in combat are almost entirely lost arts kept alive by a handful of enthusiasts who are mostly renenactors and a very few match shooters who really don't exercise those techniques in matches. No one using those weapons "sprayed and prayed." Everyone was taught to put aimed fire on the enemy, sometimes at very long range. One of the problems that General Lawtons artillery had at El Caney was the unpleasantly accurate rifle fire the Spaniards directed at his guns at a distance of over a half a mile. The question was this - is a rifle that can over an extended period, put 12 - 15 aimed shots on the enemy in a minute superior to one that can put 8 - 10 aimed shots a minute on the enemy. One of the reasons the Brits wanted to replace the Lee Enfield with the Mauser was that the Lee Enfield was extremely expensive to manufacture. In 1914 they found themselves blessed with a rifle that in the hands of the professional "Old Contemptables" could put 20 - 25 aimed shots a minute on the enemy. Suddenly the idea of replacing the more expensive SMLE with the less expensive P14 modified Mauser went away.

blackhawknj

10-26-2011, 12:37

The Cuban Campaign was a good example of how pre-war theorizing collides with reality. The idea behind the cutoff on the Krag was that in the defense the soldier would take careful aim and make every shot count, if rushed he could switch the mahazine to "ON" and make full use of it. The Army of that period put great empahsis on marksmanship, the harshest criticism of the Krag IMHO was not its method of loading but the fact that the rear sight had no windage adjustments.
The repeating rifle and smokeless powder were both pretty new concepts then, nobody really knew how they would work. At the Battle of Concon during the Chilean Civil War of 1891 it was found the tube loading rifles the troops carried had a good rate of fire, but were too slow to reload, hence the superioty of the Mannlicher and Mauser clip loaders. Remember that before 1898 the US Army's main battle experience was during the Indian Wars when they operated at long distances from the railroads, the Rule was if you need it, you brought it with you-on pack mules or in covered wagons, and you watched ammunition expenditure carefully. There were several battles in the Civil War-Pea Ridge and Stones River-where one side had to fall back because they ran out of ammunition.

Plain Old Dave

02-23-2012, 06:50

Posted elsewhere, but works for this thread:

The War Department allowed the Krag Controversy to rage to cover its doctrinal ineptitude; the US Army had not maneuvered at above Regimental level anywhere except the plains of West Point since 1865's Grand Review, and had not even had a coherent thought about anything other than small-unit (company-level) combat tactics since the last volleys were exchanged at Bentonville, NC at the close of the Civil War. Joe Wheeler and Fitz Lee were brought back into Army blue not as a political sop as is so often explained in the media. Instead, they were brought back into the Army to address a glaring lack of large-unit handling experience and a complete lack of large-unit doctrine. Shafter and the rest of senior US leadership (Lee, Wilson, and Wheeler excepted) in Cuba and the Phillipines were Company-grade officers in the Civil War, and US doctrine as demonstrated by tactics used in combat in both theaters demonstrate the Army's lack of coherent doctrine. Shafter and his contemporaries were clearly out of their depth in a modern large-scale conflict and as a result the US Army in Cuba and the P.I. was tactically deployed as a giant mass of companies or regiments. Rather than admitting that they had never thought of an armed conflict on the scale of the CW since 1865, the War Dep't "threw the Krag under the bus" so to speak, and the next 10 or so years of doctrinal reform in the War Department support this:

-1901: US Army War College established; coherent doctrine

-Dick Act, 1903 (provided for regular, large-scale training of the National Guard; "summer camp" as it's known)

-1st Chief of Staff of the US Army, 1903 (replaced the semi-independent "Commanding General of the Army", an office which had allowed superannuated Generals to ignore direct instructions from the Secretary for years; Nelson Miles was a perfect example)

-War Dept. Appropriations Act, 1903: Created the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice (NBPRP), the predecessor to the CMP. Again, more formal training for the "Militia" to correct 33 years' worth of oversight.

The period of 1899-1905 saw tremendous change and reform in the War Department; the M1903 was *part* of this reform. I read somewhere that the British cabinet member responsible for the military in the early days of WW1 said, "All that needs to be known about a modern Army is found in the several annual reports Elihu Root issued while serving as the Americans' Secretary of War." Secretary Root was a man of brilliant intellect and tremendous vision, and rather than allow the Department's dirty laundry to be aired and make his job significantly more difficult, he allowed the Krag and by inference the Ordinance Corps to be thrown under the bus to distract attention from his mission of modernizing the United States Army. Ordinance needed a house-cleaning as they had approved what THEY thought best for the Branches (Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry) since at least the CW and had not seriously been challenged by a Secretary since Jefferson Davis in the mid-1850s and the fracas over the 1855 rifle-musket. Letting Ordinance take the heat made Secretary Root's job much easier and by inference paved the way for American victory in WW1 and WW2 through scholarly review of warfighting doctrine and regular large-scale operations. Nothing the matter with the Krag; it was just a convient straw man.

5MadFarmers

02-23-2012, 07:47

One need go no further than Blunt's "perfect military rifle" nonsense to see how far out of kilter the Ordnance Department was.

To say that the General Commanding was able to wag his tongue at the Secretary isn't borne out by the history of the time. Lincoln, as an example, exerted great amounts of control; perhaps too much. In regards to small arms there are example after example where the Secretary overruled the General Commanding on selection of small arms. This would include overruling General Sherman no less. The Secretary kept the General Commanding on a tight leash.

The US Ordnance Department was incompetent. Completely. They weren't "tossed under a bus" until they finally really stuck their member in the fan during WW1. To the extent where abolishing the ordnance department was raised and only the intervention of Pershing saved them.

Your point that the Army had no clue how to fight conventional war stands. Repeaters aren't Enfield and Tower muskets. The Europeans received the same lesson, albeit in greater scale, in 1914.

It should be noted that Maxim offered them has machine gun considerably prior to the SpanAm War but the Ordnance Department's interest wasn't much to write home about. What saved the bacon in Cuba was Gatlings. Gatlings instead of Maxims. As late as 1917 they retained the Gatlings.

5MadFarmers

02-23-2012, 08:43

I read somewhere that the British cabinet member responsible for the military in the early days of WW1 said, "All that needs to be known about a modern Army is found in the several annual reports Elihu Root issued while serving as the Americans' Secretary of War."

I'm not too sure I'd quote anyone in the British establishment "in the early days of WW1" as 1914-1916 pretty much showed they were authoritative on how to get good men senselessly slaughtered and not much else....

====

I have a minute. I'll tie two bits together.

Joe Wheeler and Fitz Lee were brought back into Army blue not as a political sop as is so often explained in the media. Instead, they were brought back into the Army to address a glaring lack of large-unit handling experience and a complete lack of large-unit doctrine. Shafter and the rest of senior US leadership (Lee, Wilson, and Wheeler excepted) in Cuba and the Phillipines were Company-grade officers in the Civil War

and

-1st Chief of Staff of the US Army, 1903 (replaced the semi-independent "Commanding General of the Army", an office which had allowed superannuated Generals to ignore direct instructions from the Secretary for years; Nelson Miles was a perfect example)

Yes, General Miles is a "perfect example." A perfect example that your assertion that "the rest of the senior US leadership ... were company grade officers" is nonsense. The logical commander of the expedition was Miles and he was in fact a General Officer during the Civil War - commanding a Division. He made Major General in 1865. The sly inclusion of only Cuba and the Philippines in your paragraph, ignoring Puerto Rico, would exclude him. Except he did in fact tour the P.I. so he gets re-included on that technicality. :)

Alger, on the other hand, also made General during that war. Between Alger and his Adjutant General (Corbin) they froze Miles out. Nelson Miles was overruled on the initial strategy and also had no say in the appointment of Shafter.

Nelson Miles, despite your dislike, was actually quite gifted intellectually. Not terribly long ago I read his response to an assertion made by the Chief of Ordnance - supported by the Artillery cabal. Miles simply shredded them. Made them look like complete tools. The guy was very bright, and more importantly, had extensive experience. Ignoring him was to the detriment of the country. Just another example of how much control the Secretary had over the General Commanding.

This has drifted though. No, the Krag wasn't that bad. Compared to the Trapdoor it was down right modern. I'll end on that note: the Chief of Ordnance, during the war, testified to Congress that the Trapdoor was equal to a smokeless powder repeater. Quite the expert he was....

The Ordnance Department focused on civil engineering and disappearing cannon to the detriment of everything else. The troops paid for that.

Plain Old Dave

02-24-2012, 08:45

Shafter: Colonel, 17th USCT, *Brevet* Brigadier. For the uninitiated, this was an honorific. Now, instead of breveting, officers are given Bronze Stars, Silver Starts, etc.

Kent: Regimental CO

Hawkins: JO in CW. Staff type in pre-SAW. Maybe the closest thing to a modern officer on the field; former CO of the Point and what is now called the Staff College at Ft Leavenworth.

Wikoff: JO, 15th US.

Sumner: spent most of the War as AAG under his father, Edwin "Bull" Sumner.

Wood: No formal military training and combat in *one* fight with Indians.

The Battle History of the US Army in Cuba could just as easily be titled "Innocents Abroad", as the only deployed General Officer with experience even handling a *brigade* in combat was Major General Wheeler. I excluded Puerto Rico as it was little more than a landing party operation; company-strength skirmishing in the war's backwater.

I stand by what I said; Secretary Root decided to "not let a good crisis go to waste" and let the Krag and the Ordinance Corps take the hit for endemic, Department level failures throughout the SAW. While the Media and Officer Corps were distracted by the Krag Controversy, in a textbook example of diversion Elihu Root completely modernized the War Department. Nothing wrong with the Krag; it was a useful fall guy.

5MadFarmers

02-24-2012, 02:42

Shafter: Colonel, 17th USCT, *Brevet* Brigadier. For the uninitiated, this was an honorific. Now, instead of breveting, officers are given Bronze Stars, Silver Starts, etc.

Dwight David Eisenhower, Captain. Never left the States. Until taking command in Europe I don't think he ever heard a shot fired in anger. I'm not sure he ever heard one there either....

Kent: Regimental CO

Omar Bradley. Temporary duty on the Mexican border and then stationed in Montana. Another one never having heard a shot fired in anger.

Hawkins: JO in CW. Staff type in pre-SAW.

General Alexander Patch. Stationed at the Machine Gun school.

Wikoff: JO, 15th US.

General Jacob Devers. No combat service until WW2.

Sumner: spent most of the War as AAG under his father, Edwin "Bull" Sumner.

General Ulysses S. Grant. In the Mexican War he was with the Quartermaster Corps. No unit command of any note.

Wood: No formal military training and combat in *one* fight with Indians.

Nathan Bedford Forrest. No formal military training. Yet, with 3,500 men he thoroughly trounced the 8,500 men under General Samuel D. Sturgis. In spite of Sturgis being a graduate of West Point and having served in the Mexican War.

Back to WW2 Europe: General Courtney Hodges. He at least saw a bit of combat in France. Albeit as a very low ranking officer.

The Battle History of the US Army in Cuba could just as easily be titled "Innocents Abroad"

The Battle History of the US Army in X War could just as easily be titled "Innocents Abroad." With the high ranking US commanders in WW2, Europe, having arguably less combat experience than the Gents in Cuba.

Countering those, the French Army of 1939-1940 was riddled with officers having experience in WW1. Lieutenant General Arthur Percival commanded a Brigade in France during WW1 yet, in fortified and well prepared positions, was soundly defeated by the Japanese in WW2. In spite of the Japanese being outnumbered.

Need more examples? Cover that issue well enough?

====

We're mixing three things here, two of which are really a double-edged sword:

Doctrine. We're in violet agreement that the US Army was lacking on this score. Arguably that "Indian Wars" service you seem to wish to dismiss is, IMHO, more valuable than the "large unit command during the CW" that you seem to value so highly. The Indian War was, by any measure, a war of maneuver. The CW was a war of attrition. Cuba bears a lot more resemblance to Missionary Ridge than it does anything out West. Large unit command in the CW, like the French experience during WW1, was exactly wrong for the next war ("Cuba" vice "Indian Games".

Command Experience. This is, from what I see, more often a detriment than a plus. At the beginning of WW2 both the Army and Navy eliminated the antiquated commanders as fossils. Fossils are dangerous. They've learned much, all of it outdated, and are rarely able to unlearn that and learn what's really wanted. I'm not saying it's impossible as I'll hold out an example of somebody adaptable: MacArthur. Regardless of personal feelings about MacArthur he did in fact understand war and how to fight it. The point stands that "experience" is more often a detriment than a plus. Vietnam is a textbook example of "experienced" commanders fighting the wrong war. History is littered with examples. This ties into doctrine of course. Inexperienced commanders using outdated doctrine is no more valuable than experienced commanders using it. The experienced commanders have the advantage of having seen it all before but, again, rarely can unlearn it. Look to the Red Army circa 1945 as an example of inexperienced commanders having learned well. Stalin, by eliminating the command structure of the Red Army before the war, may have done himself a favor. I'll not belabor that any more.

Weapons. Doctrine is obviously more important in a lot of regards. We're in agreement that the Krags weren't that bad. The trapdoors were appallingly bad yet were, due to ordnance department incompetence, widely fielded. In "supporting arms" the situation was arguably worse.

No, the Krag wasn't the problem. That said the replacement by a "Mauserish" gun was the right choice. Except the same ordnance department was in charge of that and mucked that up. That's beyond the scope of this.

====

Somebody else mentioned the lack of windage on the Krag sight as an issue. Utter bunkus. The German Mauser didn't have it and didn't need it. The Model of 1917, the most fielded weapon by the US in WW1, didn't have it. In neither case was that a problem. Those are obviously not the only rifles not having it. A complex sight, incorporating windage, is generally a delicate sight which cannot withstand the rigors of service. This was pointed out, and accepted by the ordnance department, during WW1 regards the '03.

====

The Krag was ok. Then again at that time it didn't receive nearly the approbation that some are implying. Trapdoors were ripped on, the food was ripped on, the Krag got off lightly.

JBinIll

02-24-2012, 02:51

5mf,didn't Eisenhower serve in Panama and in the Philippines?

Bob S

02-24-2012, 03:09

Somebody else mentioned the lack of windage on the Krag sight as an issue. Utter bunkus. The German Mauser didn't have it and didn't need it. The Model of 1917, the most fielded weapon by the US in WW1, didn't have it. In neither case was that a problem.

They didn't have and arguably didn't need a nice little knob to twiddle, but in both cases the front sight could be drifted to establish an initial no-wind zero. I don't see any way to do this with the early Krag sights. If there was some way to establish the initial no-wind lateral zero with M1892 and 1896 sights other than dumb luck, I'd like to hear about it.

Resp'y,
Bob S.

Plain Old Dave

02-24-2012, 03:39

We're mixing three things here, two of which are really a double-edged sword:

Doctrine. We're in violet agreement that the US Army was lacking on this score. Arguably that "Indian Wars" service you seem to wish to dismiss is, IMHO, more valuable than the "large unit command during the CW" that you seem to value so highly.

There is a great difference between an overglorified constabulary chasing poorly-armed and prroly organized light cavalry about tens of millions of acres of prarie and leading a group of 5,000-10,000 men against similarly numbered and armed oppoonents.

Cuba bears a lot more resemblance to Missionary Ridge than it does anything out West.

Yes, and none of the US General Officers in Cuba (Wheeler excepted) had combat experience handling anything greater than a regiment.

Command Experience. This is, from what I see, more often a detriment than a plus.

A division/corps commander is as much a logistician as a warrior. There are so many things at that level one wouldn't think of unless one had been taught them or experienced them, like encampments; the yellow fever epidemic was entirely avoidable.

I'm not saying it's impossible as I'll hold out an example of somebody adaptable: MacArthur. Regardless of personal feelings about MacArthur he did in fact understand war and how to fight it. Violently disagree; he prolonged the Pacific Theater by at least a year. FADM Nimitz, on the other hand, knew what needed to be done.

Look to the Red Army circa 1945 as an example of inexperienced commanders having learned well. Stalin, by eliminating the command structure of the Red Army before the war, may have done himself a favor. I'll not belabor that any more.

He inadvertently prolonged the Eastern Theater by 2+ years by executing all his experienced leaders; Finland would have been a simple real estate transaction with competent leadership. As it was, though, the Winter War was lost by the Soviets for much the same reason that the battles in Cuba had such a high butcher's bill; no coherent doctrine and incompetent, inexperienced leadership. But we digress.

5MadFarmers

02-24-2012, 03:45

5mf,didn't Eisenhower serve in Panama and in the Philippines?

As I understand it Eisenhower was a cracker jack with a typewriter....

Going on about "large unit command" during the SpanAm is messed up on so many levels. During the CW guys went from "nothing" to General Officers - well before hitting 30 years of age. Thus they were still reasonably able to participate in Cuba. Later wars didn't typically see that kind of age thing as "senior" officers tended to be "senior." To rip the SpanAm guys over that is, IMHO, hogwash. Let's hit that from another angle. Of the guys accepted to have been very good at higher level commands during the CW, how many of them had experience with that in previous wars? "Doctrine" I'll accept as it's very valid. The experience thing is bunkus. All those experienced French officers, circa 1940, received an interesting lesson from Heinz Guderian. His WW1 experience? Signals and Intelligence.

Doctrine, yes, experience, no.

====

They didn't have and arguably didn't need a nice little knob to twiddle, but in both cases the front sight could be drifted to establish an initial no-wind zero. I don't see any way to do this with the early Krag sights. If there was some way to establish the initial no-wind lateral zero with M1892 and 1896 sights other than dumb luck, I'd like to hear about it

May I side step that? I wonder how many M-1917s had the windage adjusted on the line? No, there was no little knob to fiddle but I'd wager there were vanishingly few tools either.

You do raise an interesting point. Windage can be fiddled with on the fly, and that's what people typically are going on about, or it can be to set zero. While the later rifles can have that adjusted that isn't really a "line" repair. That is an ordnance repair. A rifle, Krags specifically, out of zero would be non-serviceable and should have been turned in. No different from the other rifles right? Whereas that can be fixed by ordnance in the field with the earlier ones the Krag would require deeper zone repair. Effectively that isn't a difference though.

Now let's wander just a might further. The trapdoors had windage adjustment. In Cuba how effective were trapdoors versus Krags? Which was preferred? What contribution, as a percentage, did the lack of being able to set windage in the field on the Krags have in regards poor performance seen there?

Now some speculation. At Springfield, from muskets through the M1 at least, barrels were not straight as made. Those were straightened without special tools. I'll qualify it. "James A. Yvon" spent his time in 1944 doing exactly that to M1 barrels. That was a full time job. Apparently it was more than a full time job as Joseph A. Dorval also did it as did others. What would stop them from being able to do that at a field depot? So a tool to muck with the front sight or a wooden mallet or similar. Not much difference right?

5MadFarmers

02-24-2012, 04:03

There is a great difference between an overglorified constabulary chasing poorly-armed and prroly organized light cavalry about tens of millions of acres of prarie and leading a group of 5,000-10,000 men against similarly numbered and armed oppoonents.

In many cases those "poorly armed" light cavalry were better armed than then troops chasing them. War of attrition is always wrong and that wasn't taught out West.

A division/corps commander is as much a logistician as a warrior.

The problem in Cuba had zero to do with logistics. The problem had to do with doctrinal failure (CW type) and tactical failure (ditto).

Violently disagree; he prolonged the Pacific Theater by at least a year. FADM Nimitz, on the other hand, knew what needed to be done.

Unbased assertion. You'll have to create a way for his strategy and tactics to have done so.

He inadvertently prolonged the Eastern Theater by 2+ years by executing all his experienced leaders

More likely he staved off a complete collapse, and loss, by doing so.

Finland would have been a simple real estate transaction with competent leadership.

Finland was the true genesis for the Red Army to accept that they needed to learn. Which they did rapidly against the Germans. Similar to the SpanAm War teaching the US Army they weren't the bee's knees and thus permitting them to learn from the British and French experiences in WW1.

====

MacArthur understood war of maneuver. That is something Eisenhower was never able to learn. In New Guinea MacArthur practised "hit 'em where they ain't." Ditto the P.I. Ditto Inchon. Might smarter than the Eisenhower strategy of "everybody attack all the time." Sorry, "Broad Front." The "Broad" being that Irish lady apparently.

War of maneuver: correct.
War of attrition: fills graveyards.

Which was done in Cuba?

Which was done in Puerto Rico by Miles?

There is a reason we don't hear much about Puerto Rico while we hear much about Cuba.

jon_norstog

02-24-2012, 06:09

On Nelson Miles:

Miles had something in common with MacArthur - he wanted to be President. McKinley had something in common with Truman - he was not gong to let the great general run away to glory. So Miles was put in charge of the Pueto Rican sideshow, which he handled admirably, without creating a lot of headlines. What would Miles have done in Cuba?

One possibility is he would have thrown everything he had at El Caney and then made a cavalry run down the road to Santiago, sending some units around the flank to take Kettle Hill from behind. And I think he would have had the miserable Kent relieved or at least sidelined.

Well, it was not to be. The SAW was fought for a number of political reasons, and making a hero out of Nelson Miles not one of them. So it was TR who reached the White House because of that war, and an assasin's bullet.

jn

and, PS: There was nothing "wrong" with the Krag in the SAW.

jon_norstog

02-24-2012, 07:07

Well,
I went back and reaD every post n this thread. There's a lot of material here for a revisionist history of the SAW. And by and large, I think the Krag rifle comes off pretty well in the discussion. Someone could make a book out of this thread. First one to the typewriter!

jn

Bob S

02-25-2012, 06:56

You do raise an interesting point. Windage can be fiddled with on the fly, and that's what people typically are going on about, or it can be to set zero.

All I want to know is how the rifles with no apparent windage adjustement were targeted at the armory to assure that the lateral zero was within tolerances. The first question would then be what is the tolerance? Then, how were they targeted? 220 yards at Birchem Bend? Elbow and muzzle rest? If the lateral zero was off, how was it corrected? Mechanically I don't see any way to do that. I could assume that sights with notches offset by increments were available, but I haven't seen evidence of that. I thought with all the research that you have done, you would have found a process instruction or even some grafitti that might explain how Springfield intended to prove that their rifles shot straight and how to correct them if they didn't.

I have several rifles with '92 and 96 sights, and the lateral zero's of all of them are 4-6 MOA "off" with my best imitation of the 220 grain ball ammunition. With a Mauser, S-R, M1917 or Enfield, I can move the front sight (precisely, with a threaded tool) for basic zero and then hold off for wind, and I don't have a problem with that. Short of bending a front sight or filing a rear sight notch (which I will not do), I see no way to get my fixed-wind Krags to reliably shoot where I point them. And it's beginning to sound like Springfield just didn't give a damn.

Resp'y,
Bob S.

5MadFarmers

02-25-2012, 07:40

All I want to know is how the rifles with no apparent windage adjustement were targeted at the armory to assure that the lateral zero was within tolerances. The first question would then be what is the tolerance? Then, how were they targeted? 220 yards at Birchem Bend? Elbow and muzzle rest? If the lateral zero was off, how was it corrected? Mechanically I don't see any way to do that. I could assume that sights with notches offset by increments were available, but I haven't seen evidence of that. I thought with all the research that you have done, you would have found a process instruction or even some grafitti that might explain how Springfield intended to prove that their rifles shot straight and how to correct them if they didn't.

I have several rifles with '92 and 96 sights, and the lateral zero's of all of them are 4-6 MOA "off" with my best imitation of the 220 grain ball ammunition. With a Mauser, S-R, M1917 or Enfield, I can move the front sight (precisely, with a threaded tool) for basic zero and then hold off for wind, and I don't have a problem with that. Short of bending a front sight or filing a rear sight notch (which I will not do), I see no way to get my fixed-wind Krags to reliably shoot where I point them. And it's beginning to sound like Springfield just didn't give a damn.

Resp'y,
Bob S.

The short answer is "they didn't care." Why would they? You are a target shooter and, presumably, from the target shooting school. That school, while it had great following in the US, is the minority regards military rifles. If they wanted the level of accuracy you're after they'd select a particularly accurate rifle and star gage it. "Pick of the litter"

Springfield used a system of light forming a line inside the barrel. Don't ask me the exact mechanics of it as I don't know. I know during the civil war they used light shining through a high set of windows. The light forms a line inside the barrel and they could apparently tell from that line if the barrel was straight. There is a video out there, don't ask me where but I watched it, of a guy doing that either at SA or in one of the M-1917 plants. He was holding the barrels up and, depending on what he saw, putting them into a "vice type" affair and bending them. So I'd suspect it's that same line.

They're battle implements - not target rifles. Let me move to a rifle having fancy sights and a lot of windage focus - the '03. You've reviewed Hatcher's findings on the trajectory of the M-1906 round I'd assume. Given that the cartridge's trajectory was greatly at variance in what they thought it would be one would come to the logical conclusion that they didn't really care at those ranges. The cartridge went over a decade with nobody noticing. Given the varied trajectory, there would be no way to measure lateral movement as the bullet wouldn't even strike the target in the vertical.

So, no, they didn't care at the level you windage guys are after. Because, IMHO, it doesn't matter. I've rehashed that multiple times on the trapdoor board and don't see the need to do it again.

The last answer to your question is they did in fact have guys at both SA and RIA for shooting them. Their job was shooting the guns so I'd suspect that was part of it. Video from one of the M-1917 factories survives and it shows them shooting something like 5 shots from each gun. As long as it was within the specified target area it was fine. Somebody here on Jouster posted a link to that film so perhaps a post to the gun talk forum will get somebody to remember it. It was an interesting set of films.

So, yes, accounts of that survive. And, no, they didn't care about the level you are after as they weren't making target guns. Again, the star gage program shows that pretty well.

People have been known to complain to the CMP about the "out the door" accuracy of some of the rifles purchased. The CMP's standard response is: "it's a battle rifle." I think that covers it.

You're a target shooter. Mordecai was trying his level best to not make a rifle for you.

5MadFarmers

02-25-2012, 07:59

Found it. Garand barrels. 10:27 into this video:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AiiGWNMJjgU

Straightening barrels during production.

jon_norstog

02-25-2012, 08:18

..... Springfield used a system of light forming a line inside the barrel. Don't ask me the exact mechanics of it as I don't know. I know during the civil war they used light shining through a high set of windows. The light forms a line inside the barrel and they could apparently tell from that line if the barrel was straight. There is a video out there, don't ask me where but I watched it, of a guy doing that either at SA or in one of the M-1917 plants. He was holding the barrels up and, depending on what he saw, putting them into a "vice type" affair and bending them......

5MF,

This was kind of a method: they would pick up a barrel, look through the bore at the crossed mullions of a window, and see with great clarity if it was crooked. I remember from when I was kid, reading an official biography of Eli Remington - it said that he was the man who discovered that method, and thereby greatly sped up production on the musket (or was it rifle?) contract where he worked. Whitney Arms? Apparently previous, the method involved putting a string line down the barrel.

Well, that's a "John Company" story. But I do think the method was real, whoever discovered it.

jn

Bob S

02-25-2012, 09:35

The short answer is "they didn't care." Why would they? You are a target shooter and, presumably, from the target shooting school.

To put things in perpsective, I am a target shooter who is also a combat veteran. If the sights are 4 MOA off laterally, and the shooter holds center of mass on life sized silhouette target at 300 yards, it's miss. That's the "standard" that I was asking about.

In asking this question, I was not seeking to poke anyone, living or dead, in the eye for not putting a "target style" windage adjustable sight on the early Krags. I was seeking to learn how the Armory assured that the non-adjustable battle sights would shoot reasonably true. It's obvious that you don't know, and a simple "I don't know" would suffice and I would not think any less of you for that. All this chatter about target shooters, the 03, M1906 cartridge and bent barrels is just a red herring.

Resp'y,
Bob S.

5MadFarmers

02-26-2012, 05:45

I did answer your question. They straightened the barrels via that light method.

Could they straighten them in the field? No.

Then again that (working on barrels) wasn't in keeping with the service of the rifles when they were unserviceable. Yes, there is documentation for that - a General Order. It lists the parts which could be replaced in the field. Anything more extensive than that required the rifle to be returned to the armory.

How accurate is a barrel after that method? I have no idea. Presumably it worked as the method was used for over a century.

5MadFarmers

02-26-2012, 06:45

5MF,

This was kind of a method: they would pick up a barrel, look through the bore at the crossed mullions of a window, and see with great clarity if it was crooked.

I read the methodology of how it was done but I think that's something I'd have to see in action. It had to do with the barrel being round - the line would "disappear" in one of two directions if the barrel wasn't straight. That more complex geometry than I can visualize. I mean I think I can visualize it but I'd have to see it.

Bob raises a very interesting point. Windage adjustment versus barrels out of true. That made me wonder how prevalent that was? Barrels going out of true. Given bayonet practice I'd think "very" but I don't know that. What we do see is a lack of reports on that - which would seem to indicate that it either didn't happen often or wasn't noticed. We can't prove a negative but we can look at the surrounding issues. They changed the graduations on the 1896 sights so they were aware that the guns weren't shooting right in the vertical. We also know there were complaints that the Krags weren't as accurate as the trapdoors. We further know that they were having problems with powder power yields and that would be noticed in the vertical. All of which points to them knowing where the bullets were impacting at some distance. Yet there aren't reports of them being off laterally. Why that would be isn't something I know but it's noticeable for its lack.

When they selected the rear sight they made mention of the Commission rifle. I dragged out the Commission carbine. I also took a quick look at a picture of the Spanish Mauser rear sight. The Commission doesn't have windage and the Spanish Mauser doesn't appear to either. It (the Commission) also, from what I can see, isn't driftable. I might not be seeing that right. There is a screw for the front sight but it appears to be a mounting screw. The blade is inset into a housing and that appears to be fixed in the base dimension - as in the sight can't move side to side or back and forth. I don't have a Spanish Mauser but the next time I see one I'll take a good look. I'll also drag out a Commission rifle as the carbine uses a different front end system. I'm curious if the rifle has a drift adjustment.

Bob's point remains - there are really two issues with windage with one being the barrel being out of true. That's not adjustable in any easy fashion. Then again if it happened a lot there should be reports on it but I've not seen them.

11mm

02-26-2012, 08:35

Plain Old Dave

02-26-2012, 10:55

How accurate is a barrel after that method? I have no idea. Presumably it worked as the method was used for over a century.

Not very accurate; no less of authorities than Walter Hudson and Townsend Whelen strongly recommended staying away from straightened barrels for best accuracy and far as I know a straightened barrel was rejection criteria for National Match 1903 and M1. Whelen's experience was that a straightened barrel would gradually re-take its bend as it heated. I think that the results were so unpredictable that by the M1 era at Springfield a warped barrel was scrapped rather than straightened. The Krag was very much a schoolroom for US high velocity centerfire riflery.

5MadFarmers

02-26-2012, 10:56

The commission rifle front sight is adjustable for windage. I have adjusted a couple of them with acceptable results. The way the sight is attached to the barrel shroud makes it a job that you would not want to do on the battlefield. The carbine sure would be a problem to adjust, but they must have done it, as there is a witness mark on mine. You would have to take the sight protector off, and take the barrel sleeve off and install something like a mandrel, so not an easy thing to do. Interestingly, the front sight on the M1871 Mauser is not adjustable, but on the M71/84 it is, so the Germans may have come to some conclusions about the need for adjustment. Of course, our Ordnance people perhaps did not notice that change.
The Krag front sight post is taller and also quite thin-sectioned compared with that on the 1891 and the 1893 Spanish Mauser (which is adjustable). That may have been part of the problem as lateral adjustment would have required a real clothing catcher with the tall, thin front post. Still, front sight adjustment was something that contemporary foreign Ordnance officials thought necessary.

My carbine has a number on the blade, 4, so perhaps they had varied ones.

So two things were mixed together on that:
1) Barrel/sight combination and "true"
2) Adjustable windage "on the fly."

The former being the norm with the latter being the later Krags with the former having neither.

The sight complaints I've encountered are limited to the carbine/hump issue and the 1901 being too delicate. By far the most busted part on the Krags were those rear sights. Missing bayonet came in at #2.

5MadFarmers

02-26-2012, 04:36

Not very accurate; no less of authorities than Walter Hudson and Townsend Whelen strongly recommended staying away from straightened barrels for best accuracy and far as I know a straightened barrel was rejection criteria for National Match 1903 and M1. Whelen's experience was that a straightened barrel would gradually re-take its bend as it heated. I think that the results were so unpredictable that by the M1 era at Springfield a warped barrel was scrapped rather than straightened. The Krag was very much a schoolroom for US high velocity centerfire riflery.

I guess I get to be Mr. Negative again. That film I linked to showed them straightening M1 barrels and the film is from the 1950s. The guy doing the straightening at Springfield in that film isn't marking them so I don't know how they'd tell which were and weren't?

a straightened barrel would gradually re-take its bend as it heated

That seems to make total sense. Metal has memory.

Does this mean that during the '03 era they pulled the ones that came out straight for the NM and star gage programs? I have no idea.

The Krag was very much a schoolroom for US high velocity centerfire riflery.

And smokeless powder development. Lots of problems. Barrel erosion was horrible so maybe they didn't worry about windage as the barrels wore out before getting bent. :) :) :)

Vern Humphrey

02-26-2012, 04:39

During the 'Indian Wars' the rifle in use by US was a single shot, so the Indians had a habit of charging,--- when?
At the Wagon Box Fight -- and surprise, surprise! The troops had the new breechloading Springfields.

Plain Old Dave

02-26-2012, 06:06

Pretty simple matter of selecting Star Gage/ Air Gage barrels: If they were warped, they simply were not further processed for National Match use, including star gaged/air gaged; a non NM marked barrel may have been warped or it may have failed the star gage/air gage test or may well have never been screened. Simple problems, simple solutions.

As to the Krag, read Dr. Hudson's blue book. He more or less recommends the Krag-era HP shooter "star gage" his own barrel and even includes instructions for slugging.

Thought out loud, more for the M1: I wonder how many warped op rods became so cycling beneath a warped barrel microns off from true, so close it would pass the eye test but infinitemisally warped, or that warped during rapid fire but returned to true as it cooled? Remember on the M1, the gas cylinder is also an op rod guide.

5MadFarmers

02-27-2012, 06:16

The other thought is what moves horizontal moves vertical. So much for the graduations...

Except I don't think it's that big of a deal for the ranges shot at. The bend Bob mentions is obviously a problem but there just aren't reports of it at that time. They spent a ton of time trying to figure out whether the bullets drifted left or right so presumably they did a lot of testing. Yet inaccurate barrels isn't reported. So for whatever reason it wasn't seen. I find that very hard to understand on another score as they used wood which wasn't seasoned in the 1898s. "Windage sights." Nope. The early ones, the ones rushed for the war, were given 1896 sights after the 1898s were pulled. So no windage sight and improperly cured wood - which logically should warp. Warping the barrel with it. Yet it's not reported and therefore perhaps not experienced or noticed? Sounds odd.

I think that horse is dead though. SpanAm War. The Army and general competence.

The 1st Wisconsin Infantry suffered 50% casualties. In Florida. Can you imagine how poorly the build-up was executed for a unit to have 50% casualties before it's even deployed? I'm aware that the units stationed at Chickamauga were likewise having serious problems. "Water" in that case. Latrine water and drinking water shouldn't be mixed in the ground table.

Upon return they get abused on the tip of Long Island - a short train ride from what was likely the largest collection of hospitals in the country.

Incompetence wasn't restricted to Cuba.

jon_norstog

02-27-2012, 09:53

What 5MF says. You read some of what went down in the SAW, the corruption, double dealing, profiteering and incompetence will make your hair stand on end. Compared to the SAW, the WWII of "Catch 22" was a scene of total patriotism, rectiude, and high moral standards.

To get a feel for it, "The Little War of Private Post" by Charles Johnson Post, is a good start. Amazing that he kept his sense of humor throughout that fiasco.

jn

03Springfield

02-29-2012, 03:56

Correct me if I'm wrong, but windage adjustment of what is essentially a fixed sight was not done in the field by the individual. Yes it had a dovetail and could be adjusted, but they were supposed to be issued 'zeroed'. Of course that didn't apply to the krags but for the mausers.

I don't think the krag sights had any severe disadvantage compared to any other rifles of the 1890s.

5MadFarmers

02-29-2012, 05:50

The arms repair chest, Model of 1917, contained such a tool for the M-1917 rifles. So it was able to be done in the field but not by the individual soldier.

For Krags, General Orders 14, series of 1896, lists the barrel and front sight stud as parts which, when requiring repair, requires the arm be returned to the armory. That is still the case as of 1904 (Ordnance Supply Manual - 1904).

03Springfield

02-29-2012, 06:20

5MadFarmers

02-29-2012, 07:32

Well there was also the tool used to tighten loose dovetails of the front sight band, but the 1903's front sight was designed to be replaceable not windage adjustable since it already had a moveable rear sight.

I think the idea was the unit armorer could replace the blade unit of a 1903 with an undamaged one and send the damaged one back for blade replacement, but I can't find any reference to spare sights being made available? Only the rear sight "moveable base" and the "slide caps".

That same 1904 ordnance supply manual lists front sights as being a spare part. That's rod bayonet rifles of course.

In 1910 the great State of Wisconsin had on hand:
421 Front sights.
471 Front sight pins.
50 Front sight moveable studs.
75 Front sight movable stud screws.

03Springfield

02-29-2012, 11:24

That same 1904 ordnance supply manual lists front sights as being a spare part. That's rod bayonet rifles of course.

In 1910 the great State of Wisconsin had on hand:
421 Front sights.
471 Front sight pins.
50 Front sight moveable studs.
75 Front sight movable stud screws.

I wonder if they were thinking of the entire rod bayonet front sight as replaceable (from the standpoint of a 'spare') or only the blades?

Shooter5

03-02-2012, 06:09

Random Comments shotgunned to various posts in the thread:

-Here is some current research from UNL about the SAW - http://cubanbattlefields.unl.edu/

-"Geronimo's" name wasn't...it was Goyahkla.

-It could be argued the 'Indian War' were from roughly 1492 to 1890 (not simply and always 1860-1890), thus, the Indians habit of charging after the first volley tended from rather centuries of experience! A much early example of surprise would have been in Texas with Colt's at Bandera Pass.

-Rimmed rounds obsolete? Hmm, every time a PK or SVD shoots at me I will have to remind myself of that fact.

-Medal of Honor; not the Congressional Medal of Honor.

-Resupply during westward expansion wasn't just from Railroad heads, it was done by Riverboat and wagon trains.

-The Indian Wars era was not always quite easily described as simple warfare; Indians in many cases had to fight with the added consideration of their village in tow. Any of us who have been in combat had more than enough on our hands doing the job with other 20-30 year olds by our sides...so imagine the task if your entire extended family is in the vicinity and/or being chased as 'fair game'. Little Bighorn, Wa****a, Nez Perce war, etc etc to say nothing of the conflicts east of the Mississippi, become a lesson in excellent leadership and skill when viewed from the Indian side. I doubt some modern Officers could have done as well or for so long. (See Seminoles, Apaches)